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Abstract: Problem Bożych atrybutów należy do najczęściej dyskutowanych kwestii w filozofii irlandzkiej
siedemnastego i osiemnastego stulecia. Krótko mówiąc, dotyczy on zagadnienia (i) ontologicznego: czy
atrybuty człowieka i Boga różnią się co do stopnia czy rodzaju, a także (ii) semiotycznego: w jaki sposób
posługując się naszym ludzkim językiem, powinniśmy opisywać owe atrybuty. O ile zgadzano się, że
analogie odgrywają kluczową rolę w rozwiązaniu problemu semantycznego, spierano się o to, jako sposób
wyrażania się dopuszczają; chodziło przede wszystkim o to, czy posługiwanie się analogiami podczas
orzekania o Bogu stanowi odrębny rodzaj posługiwania się językiem i czy znaczenia przekazywanego za
pomocą analogii należałoby odróżnić od znaczenia literalnego i metaforycznego. Celem mojego artykułu
jest kontekstualizacja stanowiska George’a Berkeleya odnośnie do Bożych atrybutów, wyrażonego w 21
paragrafie czwartego dialogu Alkifrona. Dokładniej rzecz ujmując, w przeciwieństwie do tego, co utrzy-
muje większość badaczy, twierdzę, że Berkeley nie zdołał zbyt dokładnie odtworzyć stanowiska kardynała
Kajetana. Chociaż w przytoczonym paragrafie Berkeley parafrazuje jego De Nominum Analogia, zapro-
ponowane przezeń rozstrzygnięcie bliższe jest stanowisku Jana Dunsa Szkota, a więc, o ironio, stanowisko,
które Kajetan starał się odrzucić.
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1.  Introduction
The controversy about the problem of divine attributes1 in Ireland started 
with John Toland’s publication of Christianity Not Mysterious (1696) which 
evoked several responses from various divines such as Peter Browne,2 
 * This research was carried out as a part of my Doc.CH grant by the Swiss Na-
tional Science Foundation (SNFS): http://p3.snf.ch/Project-172060.
 1 Although, it is custom in Berkeley scholarship to refer to this issue as the prob-
lem of “divine analogy” (S. H. Daniel, “Berkeley’s Rejection of Divine Analogy”, 
Science et esprit 63, no. 2 (2011): 149–151; T. Curtin, “Divine Analogy in Eighteenth-
Century Irish Philosophy”, The Journal of Theological Studies 65, no. 2 (October 2014): 
600–604; K. L. Pearce, “Berkeley’s Philosophy of Religion”, in The Bloomsbury Compan-
ion to Berkeley, ed. B. Belfrage & R. Brook (London & New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 
470). I speak of the problem of divine attributes. Apart from being a widely used turn 
of phrase, it is more accurate because everyone agreed analogies are important for di-
vine predication. Yet, they disagreed about the semantical nature of said predications 
as well as the role analogies play. The discussion was not about whether analogies 
are the key to solve to semantical aspect of the problem but how these solutions can 
be spelled out.
 2 P. Browne, A letter in answer to a book entitled, Christianity not mysterious as also, to 
all those who set up for reason and evidence in opposition to revelation & mysteries. Printed 
by Joseph Ray in Essex Street, 1697; P. Browne. The procedure, extent, and limits of hu-
man understanding. London: Innys & Manby, 1728.
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Edward Synge,3 William King4 and of course George Berkeley. Berke-
ley’s most detailed discussion of the issue is found in Alciphron (Alc.) 
IV, 16–22 (1732).5 There Berkeley argues the divine attributes do not dif-
fer in kind from their human counterparts and analogical predication is 
simply the usage of analogies for divine predication (Alc. IV, 21). 
In light of this argumentation, Berkeley refers to several “school-
men” ranging from Pico della Mirandola (Alc. IV, 19) to Aquinas as 
well as Suárez (Alc. IV, 20) and most notably for my purposes in § 21 to 
Thomas de Vio’s (aka Cardinal Cajetan’s) book De Nominum Analogia 
(DNA) (1498).6 While Berkeley (successfully) conveys the impression he 
is following Cajetan’s solution to the problem of divine attributes, the 
matter is more complicated. Berkeley’s own solution bears close resem-
blance to the position of John Duns Scotus. Ironically, this was precisely 
the position Cajetan aimed to reject in DNA which is set up as a defense 
of a Thomist solution to the problem of divine attributes against the criti-
cism of Scotus. 
While Berkeley’s contemporary Peter Browne already criticized 
Berkeley’s faulty exegesis of Cajetan, Browne’s insight seems to have 
been lost to most contemporary Berkeley scholars.7 Although many 
have pointed out the importance of Cajetan for Berkeley in the context 
of Alc. IV, 21,8 most of them followed James O’Higgins. The latter ar-
gued Berkeley follows Cajetan with “remarkable closeness” when deal-
ing with the problem of divine attributes and gives a “fairly accurate 
 3 E. Synge, A gentleman’s religion: in three parts. With an appendix. London: Printed 
by Richard Sare at Grays-Inn in Holborn, 1697.
 4 W. King, Divine Predestination and Foreknowledge, Consistent with the Freedom 
of Man’s will. A Sermon Preach’d at Christ-Church, Dublin, in Archbishop King’s Sermon 
on Predestination, ed. D. Berman & A. Carpenter (Dublin: Cadenus Press, 1976).
 5 Unless explicitly mentioned, references to Berkeley’s works are taken from the 
Luce & Jessop edition (The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, 9 vols. (London: 
Nelson, 1948–1957). All the quoted passages from Alciphron remained unaltered by 
Berkeley in the editions of 1732 and 1752. 
 6 The references to Cajetan are taken from: Thomas de Vio: De nominum analogia. 
De conceptu entis, ed. Zammit & H. Hering (Romae: Institutum Angelicum, 1952).
 7 P. Browne, Things Divine and Supernatural Conceived by Analogy with Things Nat-
ural and Human, by the Author of the Procedure, Extent and Limits of Human Understand-
ing (London: Innys & Manby,1733), 477–478. I will not address the question if Browne 
was right in suggesting Berkeley misrepresented Cajetan (Browne, Divine Analogy, 
449–451) or if Berkeley rather misunderstood Cajetan. My focus is primarily on show-
ing – whatever the exact reason – Berkeley failed to do justice to Cajetan’s solution 
of the problem of divine attributes, yet adopted his notion of analogy.
 8 W. W. S. March, “Analogy, Aquinas and Bishop Berkeley”, Theology 44, no. 264 
(June 1942): 321–329; E. W. Van Steenburgh, “Berkeley Revisited”, The Journal of Phi-
losophy 60, no. 4 (February 1963): 85.
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account” of Cajetan’s scholastic doctrine of analogy.9 The notable excep-
tion to this rule is Joshua Hochschild who already pointed out “Berkeley 
has not applied the details of Cajetan’s specific theory to the problem”.10 
However, neither does Hochschild point out the remarkable close-
ness between Berkeley’s proposed solution and Scotus’ position, nor is 
it clear if he thinks Berkeley could accept a Cajetinian notion of analogi-
cal predication as a mode of literal expression.11 Contrary to the latter, 
I argue Berkeley holds analogical predication simply to be the applica-
tion of attributes by analogy. Albeit, his notion of analogy is distinctively 
Cajetinian.
I develop my argument in four steps. First, by outlining Aquinas’ 
treatment of the problem of divine attributes which is prerequisite to 
understanding Cajetan’s central aim in DNA, viz. to defend “analogi-
cal predication” as a separate mode of literal expression against Scotus’ 
criticism. Both of which are the topic of the third section. I proceed by 
showing in what respect Berkeley’s own solution does justice to Ca-
jetan’s position and more importantly in what respect Berkeley does not 
represent the latter’s position. Rather, Berkeley’s solution is very akin 
to the one Scotus proposed. I close this paper by outlining some sys-
tematical advantages of my proposed reading. Although, Berkeley fails, 
from a contextual point of view, to do justice to Cajetan’s solution of the 
problem of divine attributes it is nonetheless systematically worthwhile 
to analyze DNA because Berkeley does adopt Cajetan’s notion of anal-
ogy and metaphor. As I sketch it provides the basis for a more precise 
understanding of Berkeley’s notion of analogy which, in turn, will be 
useful for the analysis of his notions of likeness in particular and rela-
 9 Interestingly, O’Higgins argues for this in light of other criticism in Divine Anal-
ogy (J. O’Higgins, “Browne and King, Collins and Berkeley: Agnosticism or Anthro-
pomorphism?”, The Journal of Theological Studies 27, no. 1, (April 1976): 96–98). Similar 
contentions are found in: G. Brykman, “Berkeley et l’analogie des noms”, Les Études 
philosophiques 3, no. 4 (December 1989): 445–453; G. Brykman, Berkeley et le voile des 
mots (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993), 448–451); T. M. Bettcher, “Berkeley’s dualistic ontology”, 
Análisis filosófico 28, no. 2 (November 2008): 162; T. M. Bettcher, Berkeley’s Philosophy 
of Spirit (London & New York: Continuum, 2007), 57; Daniel, “Berkeley’s Rejection”, 
155–157; Pearce, “Berkeley’s Philosophy of Religion”, 481 (FN 11) & K. L. Pearce, 
“Matter, God, Nonsense”, in Berkeley’s Three Dialogues: New Essay, ed. S. Storrie (Ox-
ford: OUP, 2018), 190 (FN 26). Although, the latter never explicitly states he agrees 
with the contention, he does at least not provide any indication O’Higgins’ assess-
ment could be incorrect.
 10 J. P. Hochschild, “George Berkeley and a theory of analogy”, The Downside Re-
view 122, No. 428 (July 2004): 163.
 11 Hochschild, “George Berkeley”, 157–165. Hence, we cannot call Berkeley either 
a Thomist or a Scotist in the strict sense. Accordingly, the point I wish to make is not 
that Berkeley was a Scotist. Rather, if we want to compare Berkeley’s solution to pro-
posals of the Scholastics, it is more akin to Scotus’ than Cajetan’s or Aquinas’.
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tion in general. The latter is especially important if we consider Berkeley 
treats relations as an “object of human knowledge” on the same footing 
as ideas and minds (PHK § 89). 
2.  The Problem of Divine Attributes 
Although the problem of divine attributes can be traced back to the ear-
liest Christian writers such as Augustine or Boethius, I will restrict my 
outline of the problem to Aquinas’ treatment of it. This restriction suf-
fices to introduce all the necessary distinctions which allow to expose 
the parallels between Berkeley’s and Scotus’ position. It is moreover his-
torically justified because Cajetan wished to defend a Thomist solution 
of the problem of divine attributes against the criticism of Scotus.12
While the problem of divine attributes has an ontological aspect, 
viz. the question if human and divine attributes differ in kind or degree, 
the focus of this section is on its semantical aspect, i.e. on the question 
of how we ought to describe these divine attributes with human lan-
guage. As Aquinas points out in De veritate, there are two ways to speak 
(modus loquendi) of God; either we speak properly (propriam) or figura-
tively (figurativam) (De veritate, q. 23 a. 3 co.). I will refer to these two 
ways of speaking as literal (i.e. proper) and metaphorical (i.e. figurative) 
modes of speech because what remains implicit when Aquinas names 
these options is the fact that our language in general only has two differ-
ent modi: the literal and metaphorical. At first sight, it may seem as if we 
can only metaphorically (metaphorice) speak of God because everything 
we predicate of God is taken from the creatures (ST Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1). 
Yet, Aquinas insists, “not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical 
sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense” 
(ST Iª q. 13 s. c),13 viz. the so-called divine perfections (perfectiones) (ST Iª 
q. 4). This is important because when Aquinas asks, “Whether some 
names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?”14 
 12 While Cajetan repeatedly professes to follow Aquinas’ views (cf. DNA §§ 6, 17, 
21, 28–30, 68, 109, 123 etc.) I take this to be an affirmation of his Thomist stance, rather 
than an attempt to systematize Aquinas. In that regard, I agree with Hochschild’s 
reading of DNA who defends it at length in the first two chapters of his book The 
Semantics of Analogy: rereading Cajetan’s De nominum analogia (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2010). For a different reading see e.g. R. McInerny, Aquinas and 
analogy (Washington D.C.: CUA Press, 1996), 31–34 or Bettcher, “Dualistic Ontology”, 
160.
 13 Transl. by the English Dominican Fathers. Original: “Non igitur omnia nomina 
dicuntur de Deo metaphorice, sed aliqua dicuntur proprie”.
 14 Transl. by the English Dominican Fathers. Original: “utrum nomina aliqua di-
cantur de Deo et creaturis univoce, vel aequivoce”.
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(ST Iª pr.) this question is posed within the realm of literal speech. Given 
it is possible to speak literally of God, Aquinas enumerates the two prima 
facie options. Call these: “modes of (literal) expression”. While univo-
cal predication (univoce praedicari) is made by using a word in the ex-
act same sense, i.e. with the same signification (rationem omnino eadem), 
something is equivocally (aequivoce) predicated if the word in question is 
used in a different sense, i.e. with entirely different significations (ratio-
nes omnino diversa) (Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 1 n. 7).
Let us now turn to the problem of the divine attributes or “names” 
(nominum) as Thomas says (ST Iª q. 13 pr.). Thomas argues it is impos-
sible to use either univocal or equivocal predication when speaking 
of God. We cannot use univocal predication because we can only use 
a word in the same sense if the things they are predicated of are at least 
generically alike. Yet, (seemingly) there can be no likeness at all (nulla 
potest esse similitude) between God and created beings or creatures, such 
as humans, because the latter are only finite (cum creatura sit finite) (De 
veritate, q. 2 a. 11 arg. 1–2). The problem is not merely one of different 
degrees. Consider the case of wisdom (sapentia): while “wisdom” predi-
cated of humans only denotes a quality (qualitas) (ST Iª q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1), 
i.e. something which you can have (more or less of), it does not in the 
case of God. Rather, God is called “wise” or “good” (bonus) because God 
is wisdom or goodness (bonitas) itself (SG I c. 33). 
This fundamental difference between the nature of God and the crea-
tures renders it impossible to attribute anything of them univocally (SG 
I c. 32). Hence, it seems divine predications have to be equivocal, i.e. 
made in a different sense. Aquinas points out this would be problematic 
because “if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could 
be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would 
always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation” (ST Iª q. 13 a. 5 co.). 
15 This, in turn, would lead to an agnostic notion of God. Moreover, it is 
contrary to the fact that philosophers have proven many things about 
God (demonstrative de Deo probant) and to what the Bible says (ST Iª q. 13 
a. 5 co.).16
 15 Transl. by the English Dominican Fathers. Original: “Quia secundum hoc, ex 
creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fal-
lacia aequivocationis”. The “fallacy of equivocation” was also called a “Four Term 
Fallacy”. Instead of the three terms required for a proper syllogism it contains four 
because one of the three terms is used in different significations or equivocally.
 16 As Thomas points out, not only does the bible say we can understand God by 
way of understanding created things (Rm. 1: 20) (ST Iª q. 13 a. 5 co.) but also we are 
made in his image (imago dei thesis) (Gn. 1: 26) (c ST Iª q. 93). The situation gets even 
worse considering, as Thomas does (cf. SG I 29; De veritate, q. 2 a. 11), the Bible seem-
ingly contains conflicting remarks on the imago dei thesis (cf. Isiah 40: 18; Psalm 70: 19) 
which raises theological concerns since it contains the word of God. This highlights 
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Aquinas seems to face a dilemma: It seems our language is not able 
to describe God while it is, at the same time, the only means we have to 
know anything about God. Aquinas does not solve this problem by opt-
ing for either mode of literal expression. Rather, he introduces a third 
mode: “analogical predication” which is supposed to be the medium 
(medius) between univocal and equivocal predication (ST Iª q. 13 a. 5 co.). 
In distinction to the latter two, the significations of the words in analogi-
cal predication are neither entirely the same (omnino eadem) nor absolute-
ly different (omnino diversa) but partly the same (partim non diversa) and 
partly different (partim diversa) (Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 4 l. 1 n. 7). 
This characterization of “analogical predication” raises many ques-
tions. Especially, how can it provide a solution to the problem of divine 
attributes? However, these questions can be neglected for the present 
purpose. The important point is that Aquinas understood analogical 
predication as a mode of literal expression – next to univocal and equiv-
ocal predication. Moreover, it is this mode of literal expression which 
could do justice to the simultaneous likeness and differences between 
human and divine nature and hence solve the problem of divine attri-
butes (ST Iª q. 13 a. 6 / SG I c. 34).
3.  A Scotist Attack and a Cajetinian Defense
The position of Aquinas was famously attacked by John Duns Scotus 
who argued only univocal predication can evade the fallacy of equivo-
cation (Ord. 1.3.1.1–2, n. 40).17 For Scotus meaningful words are either 
used univocally or equivocally. If a term is used univocally we cannot 
simultaneously affirm (affirmando) and negate (negando) it of something 
without a contradiction (Ord. 1.3.1.1–2, n. 26). For example, it is not pos-
sible without contradiction to univocally predicate Socrates is and is 
not human while we can, without contradiction, (equivocally) predicate 
Aquinas’ concerns were not merely semantical or epistemological. Rather, theological 
concerns are a major factor for introducing analogical predication. Moreover, Aqui-
nas does provide an ontological solution to the problem of our simultaneous (un-) 
likeness with God: we are like God as we try to imitate God but unlike God as we can 
never achieve a perfect imitation (ST Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 1). 
 17 Although the target of Scotus’ argumentation was more likely Henry of Ghent 
than Aquinas (Ord. 1.3.1.1–2, n. 20) I assume – following Richard Cross – the argu-
ments apply mutatis mutandis to Aquinas (Duns Scotus. Great Medieval Thinkers (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 34–37). This is moreover historically justified 
in the context of my argument because Cajetan refers to the version of this argument 
from the Ordinatio (formerly Opus oxoniense) when defending his Thomist position 
(DNA § 113). 
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Socrates hits the ball with a bat (piece of wood) but not with a bat (noc-
turnal mammal).
Contrary to Aquinas, Scotus does not think we can evade the fallacy 
of equivocation by using analogical predication. He does not even be-
lieve there is a separate third mode of literal expression. Rather, analogi-
cal predication is reducible to equivocal (Lec. 1.3.1.1–2, n. 11). At least 
both modes lead to syllogisms with four terms, i.e. a fallacy of equivoca-
tion. This worry becomes evident when Scotus argues we cannot even 
understand the signification (ratio) of wise (sapiens) when applied to God 
unless it is attributed univocally, i.e. if it has the same signification as 
when attributed to the creatures. Otherwise, we could just as well say 
“God is a stone (lapis)” since “stone” would signify something else any-
way (Ord. 1.3.1.1–2, n. 39–40). If we do not use univocal predication, 
it would be possible to say anything about God which in turn would 
lead to the perishing (periret) of theology (Lec. 1.3.1.1–2, n. 113) because 
we could know nothing about God.
Scotus thought univocal predication was the only option to ensure 
a syllogism consists of three terms only, i.e. to evade the fallacy of equiv-
ocation. Given this criticism, the challenge for later Thomists, such as 
Cajetan, was to show how analogical predication was distinct from the 
other modes of literal expression while showing how it does not fall prey 
to the fallacy of equivocation. 
Although Cajetan took Scotus’ criticism seriously – which is obvious 
as he devotes the whole Chapter Ten of DNA to dealing with it – he was 
not convinced it was a decisive objection. On the contrary, he not only 
followed Aquinas in understanding analogical predication as a separate 
mode of literal expression: viz. as the medium between univocal and 
equivocal predication (DNA §§ 31 & 61) but also in holding it to be the 
key to solve the problem of divine attributes (DNA §§ 82, 109–110). Yet, 
because of Scotus it was necessary to clarify more precisely how this so-
lution works. In this context, Cajetan introduces three modes of analogy 
(DNA § 3):
i)  The analogy of inequality (analogiam inequalitas)
ii)  The analogy of attribution (analogiam attributionis)
iii)  The analogy of proportion (analogia proportionalitas)
These modes do not simply describe three different ways of ana-
logical predication in the sense of a separate mode of literal expression. 
Rather, analogical predication has a double meaning in Cajetan’s writ-
ings. Apart from the previously introduced mode of literal expression, 
it can also denote a predication made by an analogy.18 
 18 The idea that analogical predication also concerns the (semantical) form of the 
predication is already implicit in Aquinas (cf. De veritate, q. 2 a. 11).
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Analogies are comparisons based on similarity. Cajetan’s threefold 
distinction is one of three kinds of comparisons distinguished according 
to their structure and the similarity of their relata. The latter, in turn, is 
the key to explain why only the analogy of proportion allows for genu-
ine analogical predication – i.e. not only in the sense of a predication 
made by analogy but of a separate mode of literal expression. This is 
why Cajetan says it is “the only analogy properly deserving the name” 
(sola proprie analogia vocetur) (DNA § 23) while he rejects the analogy 
of inequality (DNA § 7) and the analogy of attribution (DNA §§ 19–21) 
for only allowing univocal and equivocal predication respectively. 
The analogy of proportion, which Cajetan introduces in the third 
chapter and elaborates in the rest of the book, is a comparison of two 
similar relations. Originally used in mathematics to describe the similar-
ity of two proportions (similitude duarum proportionum) such as 8 to 4 and 
6 to 3. Subsequently, the term “proportion” has been extended (extend-
erunt) to describe any similarity of relations (habitudinum) (DNA § 24) 
according to the well-known scheme A:B::C:D. 
In light of this four-term structure Cajetan’s choice is surprising be-
cause how could this structure help to evade the fallacy of equivocation? 
According to Cajetan the similarity of relations or “proportionality” is 
able to do so since it leads to a proportional unity between the significa-
tions (ratios) (DNA § 23).19 Cajetan argues this proportional unity of sig-
nifications is one without mixture (coniunctim) or separation (disiunctim) 
of the significations in questions (DNA § 111). According to Cajetan, this 
was overlooked by Scotus and his followers when they rejected analogi-
cal predication. Their analysis was one-sided in that they only focused 
(inspicientes) on the differences but failed to pay attention to (non consid-
erat) what is common (DNA § 106). Hence, they did not realize wisdom 
(sapentia) can be analogically predicated of God and the creatures be-
cause although wisdom does not signify the same in each instance their 
significations (rationem) are proportionally one (unam) (DNA § 111) and 
hence a syllogism would only consist of three terms (DNA § 109).20
The previous characterization of Cajetan’s views suffices for my ar-
gument. The important points for which are: 
i)  The idea that predications may be called analogical because they 
are made by an analogy. 
 19 Although this sounds circular and Cajetan has indeed been accused of circular-
ity, I will not deal with this issue here since it does not impede on my argument. Yet, 
I agree with Hochschild the circularity-objection can be rejected (Hochschild, Seman-
tics of Analogy, 132–139). 
 20 As Hochschild pointed out Cajetan adopts this notion of proportional unity 
from Aristotle (Metaphysics 5.6 1016b31-1017a2) in order to highlight the “metaphysi-
cal mistake” made by Scotists, i.e. “the failure to grasp the reality, even the possibility, 
of proportional unity” (Hochschild, “George Berkeley”, 161).
41A Scotist Nonetheless? George Berkeley, Cajetan, and the Problem of Divine Attributes
ii)  The rejection of Scotus’ criticism by defending the Thomist con-
ception of analogical predication as a separate mode of literal ex-
pression which is done by:
iii)  introducing a specific mode of analogy – viz. the analogy of pro-
portions (A:B::C:D). 
If a predication is made according to this mode of analogy, it enables 
analogical predication as a separate mode of literal expression by pro-




With this background in mind, let us turn to Berkeley’s Cajetan exegesis 
in Alc. IV, 21. Berkeley, or rather one of his spokesmen, Crito, starts the 
section by saying: 
But, to prevent any man’s being led, by mistaking the Scholastic use 
of the terms analogy and analogical, into an opinion that we cannot frame 
in any degree a true and proper notion of attributes applied by analogy, 
or, in the School phrase, predicated analogically, it may not be amiss to 
inquire into the true sense and meaning of those words.21
Although, he is not explicitly referring to Cajetan at this point, the 
latter’s influence is already recognizable. As I pointed out in the previous 
section, the notion of analogical predication not only as a mode of lit-
eral expression but as a predication done by analogy is very important 
for Cajetan’s argument. Moreover, the following inquiry into the “true 
sense and meaning” of analogy and analogical is nothing less than a trans-
lated paraphrase of the third chapter of DNA. Berkeley starts by high-
lighting the Greek origin (DNA § 28) and the originally mathematical 
usage of analogies (DNA § 24). Additionally, he provides two examples 
to be found in DNA §§ 23 & 28. He even includes a footnote referring to 
the third chapter: “Vide Cajetan, de Nom. Analog., c. 3” (Works III, 169).22 
In light of all this, it is safe to assume Berkeley adopts the previous-
ly mentioned understanding of analogical predication as a predication 
done by analogy from Cajetan as well. The important question arising 
 21 Alc. IV, 21, 169.
 22 Jessop and Luce fail to mention both examples can be found in Aquinas, rather 
than only the prince and the pilot (Works III, 169). For the intellect/sight example, 
cf. De veritate, q. 2 a. 11 co.
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from thence: does he also adopt Cajetan’s notion of analogical predica-
tion as a separate mode of literal expression?
At first sight, it seems as if Berkeley does. Especially, if we consider 
that most of Berkeley’s contemporaries, contrary to most Scholastics, 
treated analogical predication not as a separate mode of literal expres-
sion but of speech. Take the example of William King who argues in his 
sermon on Divine Predestination (1709) we should “ascribe these attri-
butes [referring to the perfectiones] to God…by analogy” (§ 4). However, 
King tries to distinguish these analogical predications from literal (§§ 6, 
14, 22, 35 & 36) as well as metaphorical speech (§§ 21–22). Thusly, King 
treats these predications in an “analogical sense” (§ 33) on equal foot-
ing with predications made in the literal or metaphorical sense. Hence, 
when Berkeley insists in Alc. IV, 21 analogical predication should be 
considered as part of literal speech he is in that regard very faithful to 
Cajetan’s understanding of analogical predication.23 
However, Berkeley’s insistence that analogical predication should 
be considered as a part of literal speech does not straightforwardly 
imply he accepted analogical predication as a separate mode of literal 
expression. While the former was also accepted by Scotus and many 
of his followers, the latter understanding was unique to Thomists such 
as Cajetan. However, Berkeley’s following elaborations give no indica-
tion he adopted this Thomist understanding. On the contrary, looking at 
the solution Berkeley advances in the following, it becomes evident his 
position is closer to Scotus than Cajetan. In that regard, it is more than 
telling Berkeley never uses “proportional unity” or “identity” when ex-
plaining “what Cajetan calls analogia proprie facta” (Alc. IV, 21, 170).24 Not 
to mention, Cajetan never uses the phrase analogia proprie facta in DNA 
at all. While this may simply be a slip of the pen, Berkeley’s explanation 
of how it solves the problem of divine attributes hardly is:
 23 Berkeley uses proper as the translation for propriam instead of literal (cf. e.g. King 
in § 5). Yet, not only does proper traditionally refer to literal speech, Berkeley explicitly 
assimilates the two – at least in context of the problem of divine attributes when criti-
cizing King’s sermon, i.a. for the insufficient distinction between metaphor and anal-
ogy, shortly after its publication (Letter 12 in M. A. Hight, The correspondence of George 
Berkeley (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), 36).
 24 “Proportionality“, i.e. proportionalitas, is only used once by Berkeley in § 25 
of the Analyst, although in a mathematical context. Pascal Taranto only recently pro-
vided an interesting discussion about the difference of proportion and proportion-
ality and its implications for the problem of divine attributes (cf. his presentation: 
“Berkeley, Browne, and Divine Analogy” (June 2018)). While Taranto also provided 
insights to the mathematical, or rather Euclidian, roots of this notion of analogy, he 
does not pay attention to Berkeley’s faulty Cajetan exegesis and almost Scotist solu-
tion.
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And after this same analogy [referring to analogia proprie facta; MF] we 
must understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity which in them-
selves simply, and as such, denote perfection [i.e. the perfections; MF]. We 
may, therefore, consistently with what hath been premised, affirm that all 
sorts of perfection which we can conceive in a finite spirit are in God, but 
without any of that alloy which is found in the creatures.25
Apart from the traditional thesis only perfections such as wisdom and 
goodness can be literally attributed to God, Berkeley suggests the blue-
print of such attributes is found in finite spirits (i.e. created beings or 
creatures). Berkeley argues we only have to remove the imperfections 
of these attributes, which they exhibit due our finiteness, to get a “direct 
or proper notion, though never so inadequate, of knowledge or wisdom, 
as they are in the Deity” (Alc. IV 21, 170).26 
Berkeley’s explanation seems to be at odds with Cajetan’s solution 
which does not require any removing (of imperfections) whatsoever. 
Rather, Cajetan tried to explain how human and divine wisdom can be 
one, despite being different (DNA § 111). The difference between their 
solutions emerges most clearly in Alc. IV, 22 where Berkeley uses the fal-
lacy of equivocation to make his point:
…the same arguments that prove a first cause proving an intelligent 
cause; intelligent, I say, in the proper sense; wise and good in the true 
and formal acceptation of the words. Otherwise, it is evident that every 
syllogism brought to prove those attributes, or (which is the same thing) 
to prove the being of a God, will be found to consist of four terms, and 
consequently can conclude nothing. But for your part, Alciphron, you 
have been fully convinced that God is a thinking intelligent being, in the 
same sense with other spirits, though not in the same imperfect manner 
or degree.27
Cajetan solved the problem of the fallacy of equivocation by pro-
viding an account of how analogical predication leads to the unification 
of two of the four terms and hence a valid syllogism. However, none 
of this is found in Berkeley’s argument. On the contrary, Berkeley uses 
the fallacy of equivocation to show predications of humans and God are 
made in the same sense. Rather than explaining how analogical predi-
cation as a mode of literal expression could evade the fallacy, Berkeley 
echoes a very Scotist point: viz. only univocal predication can evade the 
fallacy of equivocation. Similarly to Scotus, Berkeley does not try to do 
 25 Alc. IV 21, 170. 
 26 Berkeley made the same proposal as early as 1713 in the Three Dialogues (DHP 
231–232).
 27 Alc. IV 22, 171, my emphases.
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justice to God’s different nature by using a special mode of literal ex-
pression. Rather, Berkeley insists there is a gradual difference between 
the natures of God and humans which is why we have to use analo-
gies in the first place. Yet, we can predicate certain attributes univocally 
of God and humans.28
In conclusion, Berkeley does justice to Cajetan’s solution inasmuch 
as he is right to point out, against a prevalent conception of his contem-
poraries that analogical predication should be considered as a part of lit-
eral speech. However, Berkeley clearly departs from Cajetan when he 
argues these predications are made in the same sense. In that regard, his 
position is very akin to Scotus’. From today’s point of view, Berkeley’s 
univocal solution is closer to Scotus’ than Cajetan and hence, ironically, 
closer to a position Cajetan aimed to reject in the first place. 
5.   Berkeley’s Cajetinian Notion of Analogy  
and Metaphor
Despite the faulty Cajetan exegesis by Berkeley, which has to be criti-
cized from a contextual point of view, considering DNA proves to be 
systematically useful. It provides insights into Berkeley’s philosophy be-
cause Berkeley not only paraphrases Cajetan but also adopts his notions 
of analogy and of (some) metaphors as analogies. As the quote from the 
beginning of the previous section already clarified, Berkeley uses the 
paraphrase of Cajetan’s third chapter in DNA to explain the “true sense 
and meaning” of analogy:
Every one knows that analogy is a Greek word used by mathematicians 
to signify a similitude of proportions. For instance, when we observe that 
two is to six as three is to nine, this similitude or equality of proportion 
is termed analogy. And, although proportion strictly signifies the habi-
tude or relation of one quantity to another, yet, in a looser and translated 
sense, it hath been applied to signify every other habitude; and conse-
quently, the term analogy comes to signify all similitude of relations or 
habitudes whatsoever. 29 … For the farther clearing of this point, it is to 
 28 A similar point is made by Cross in regard to Scotus’ solution: “[t]he difference 
between God and creatures, at least with regard to God’s possession of the pure per-
fections, is ultimately one of degree. Specifically, the perfections exist in an infinite 
degree in God, and in a finite degree in creatures ” (Cross, Duns Scotus, 39).
 29 Compare: Quamvis autem proportio vocetur certa habitudo unius quantitatis 
ad aliam, secundum quod dicimus quatuor duplam proportionem habere ad duo; 
et proportionalitas dicatur similitudo duarum proportionum, secundum quod dici-
mus ita se habere octo ad quatuor quemadmodum sex ad tria utrobique enim dupla 
proportio est, etc.; transtulerunt tamen Philosophi proportionis nomen ad omnem 
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be observed that a twofold analogy is distinguished by the Schoolmen, 
metaphorical and proper.30
Following Cajetan, Berkeley not only points out the mathematical 
origin, but understands analogies as comparisons involving a similarity 
of relations according to the scheme A:B::C:D which can be called proper 
or metaphorical. However, Berkeley does not explicate how these rela-
tions are similar. Following Hochschild I propose to speak of a “func-
tional similarity” by which I mean a likeness of purpose: two relations 
are functionally similar if A serves the same purpose (for B) as C does 
for D.31 
We might consider the example Berkeley adopts from Cajetan, of the 
analogy between intellect and sight which are the same “forasmuch as 
the intellect [A] is to the mind [B] what sight [C] is to the body [D]” (Alc. 
IV, 21, 169). While Berkeley does not explicate inasmuch they are the 
same, an explanation can be found in DNA. In § 23, Cajetan explains the 
analogy between intellect and sight holds because both allow, mind and 
body respectively, to see (videre). Of course, this does not entail we see 
precisely the same way by intellect and sight. On the contrary, Cajetan 
makes clear this is not the case by writing of videre corporali vision and 
videre intellectualiter. However, it is precisely because intellect and sight 
serve the same purpose we can even speak of videre in both cases. More 
importantly, videre is not used in a metaphorical sense but literally be-
cause neither the nature of intellect nor of sight prevents the predication 
of videre in a literal sense. This in distinction to the case where a blooming 
field (prato virenti) is called smiling (ridens) (DNA § 25). While the bloom-
ing of flowers is functionally similar to a smiling mouth (i.e. it pleases 
people), fields of flowers are not the kind of entities which can be prop-
erly or literally speaking said to smile. For this they would need a mouth 
as well as an intellect.32 
habitudinem conformitatis, commensurationis, capacitatis, etc. Et consequenter pro-
portionalitatem extenderunt ad omnem similitudinem habitudinum. Et sic in propo-
sito vocabulis istis utimur (DNA § 24).
 30 Alc. IV, 21, 169f. Compare: Fit autem duobus modis analogia haec: scilicet me-
taphorice et proprie (DNA § 25).
 31 Hochschild, The Semantics of Analogy, 2. For the present consideration we may 
neglect the question how “objective” or “God given” these purposes are. Although, 
it is likely Berkeley understood them to be at least as partly objective. For Berkeley 
does not only accept “final causes” but thinks philosophers should consider the “vari-
ous ends, to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally 
with unspeakable wisdom contrived” (PHK § 107).
 32 While this explanation is absent in DNA it can be found in Aquinas (cf. ST IIIª 
q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3 & q. 24 a. 2 ad 2) from whom Cajetan probably adopted this example. 
Moreover, it was a Scholastic standard example for a metaphor. Berkeley does not 
use this example at all but the (metaphorical) predication of body parts and passions 
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Although this line of reasoning relies heavily on an ontology based 
on the Aristotelian categories which is not easily reconcilable with Berke-
ley’s immaterialism, the important point for my purpose is the follow-
ing: the idea that videre is used literally when predicated of intellect or 
sight is in principle perfectly acceptable for Berkeley. In fact, Cajetan’s 
use of videre is akin to Berkeley’s broad (but literal) use of “perceive” 
when e.g. saying of ideas of imagination as well as sense “their esse is 
percipi” (PHK § 3). While the ideas of sense are “real things” the ideas 
of imagination are only their “copies” and hence there are obvious dif-
ferences in perceiving either (PHK §§ 8 & 34) – e.g. under normal circum-
stances we need our sense organs to perceive the former.
Moreover, adopting Cajetan’s notion of metaphors as analogies does 
not imply Berkeley has to accept the Aristotelian categories, despite Ca-
jetan’s explicit acceptance of the latter (DNA §§ 5, 11, 19, 28 & 58). It suf-
fices Berkeley does accept while some metaphors are analogies, there are 
some analogies that do not include metaphorical speech but only words 
used in their “proper signification” (Alc. IV, 21, 170). Of course, it will 
be necessary to spell out what this proper meaning entails and how it is 
distinguished from improper signification. Yet, if my reading is correct, 
this, taken together with Berkeley’s notion of functional similarity as 
well as its relation to Berkeley’s notion of likeness in general, are some 
of the main tasks ahead. 
6.  Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to show Berkeley’s solution to the prob-
lem of divine attributes is closer to Scotus than Cajetan. For this it was 
prerequisite to introduce said problem as Aquinas conceived of it. Most 
importantly, Aquinas introduced analogical predication as a separate 
mode of literal expression which he argued would solve this problem. 
While Scotus attacked this Thomist solution by arguing it would lead to 
the fallacy of equivocation, Cajetan set out to defend it against this criti-
cism in De Nominum analogia. 
Although Berkeley refers to Cajetan’s book and moreover adopts his 
notion of analogy as a comparison of functionally similar relations, Ber-
keley does not embrace Cajetan’s Thomist understanding of analogical 
predication as a separate mode of literal expression. Rather, Berkeley 
defends a position akin to Scotus’ according to which the difference be-
tween God and humans is merely gradual which allows for univocal 
of God. Although, he follows the same rationale when he says that e.g. in case of a fin-
ger “it is as truly ascribed to God as the works wrought by human fingers are to man” 
(Alc. IV, 21, 170).
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predication. For Berkeley, analogical predication is just one done by us-
ing an analogy while the predicated words are used in the same sense 
when applied to the divine and human.33
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Summary
The problem of divine attributes was one of the most intensely debated top-
ics in the 17–18th century Irish philosophy. Simply put, the problem revolves 
around the ontological question (i) whether human and divine attributes differ 
in degree or in kind, and the semantical (ii) how we ought to describe these di-
vine attributes by means of our human language. While there was a consensus 
that analogies play a key role in solving the semantical problem there was a con-
troversy about the kind of speech they allow for. Especially, it was contested if 
using analogies for divine predication allows for a separate kind of speech, i.e. 
allows us to speak neither literally nor metaphorically but analogically.
The aim of my paper is to contextualize George Berkeley’s position on the 
problem of divine attributes as developed in § 21 of the IV. Dialogue in Alciphron. 
More specifically and contrary to what most scholars hold, I argue Berkeley fails 
to follow Cardinal Cajetan with remarkable closeness. Despite paraphrasing 
parts of Cajetan’s De Nominum Analogia in § 21, the solution Berkeley advances is 
closer to the position of John Duns Scotus – and hence, ironically, with the posi-
tion Cajetan aimed to reject.
Keywords: George Berkeley; Cajetan; Aquinas; Scotus; Alciphron: The minute phi-
losopher; divine attributes; divine analogy; Berkeley’s notion of analogy
Streszczenie
A jednak skotysta? George Berkeley, Kajetan  
i kwestia Bożych atrybutów
Problem Bożych atrybutów należy do najczęściej dyskutowanych kwestii w filo-
zofii irlandzkiej siedemnastego i osiemnastego stulecia. Krótko mówiąc, dotyczy 
on zagadnienia (i) ontologicznego: czy atrybuty człowieka i Boga różnią się co 
do stopnia czy rodzaju, a także (ii) semiotycznego: w jaki sposób, posługując się 
naszym ludzkim językiem, powinniśmy opisywać owe atrybuty. O ile zgadzano 
się, że analogie odgrywają kluczową rolę w rozwiązaniu problemu semantycz-
nego, spierano się o to, jaki sposób wyrażania się dopuszczają; chodziło przede 
wszystkim o to, czy posługiwanie się analogiami podczas orzekania o Bogu sta-
nowi odrębny rodzaj posługiwania się językiem i czy znaczenia przekazywane 
za pomocą analogii należałoby odróżnić od znaczenia literalnego i metaforycz-
nego. 
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Celem mojego artykułu jest kontekstualizacja stanowiska George’a Berkeleya 
odnośnie do Bożych atrybutów, wyrażonego w 21 paragrafie czwartego dialogu 
Alkifrona. Dokładniej rzecz ujmując, w przeciwieństwie do tego, co utrzymuje 
większość badaczy, twierdzę, że Berkeley nie zdołał zbyt dokładnie odtworzyć 
stanowiska kardynała Kajetana. Chociaż w przytoczonym paragrafie Berkeley 
parafrazuje jego De Nominum Analogia, zaproponowane przezeń rozstrzygnięcie 
bliższe jest stanowisku Jana Dunsa Szkota, a więc, o ironio, stanowisku, które 
Kajetan starał się odrzucić. 
Słowa kluczowe: George Berkeley, Kajetan, Tomasz z Akwinu, Duns Szkot, Al-
kifron, Boże atrybuty, Boża analogia, Berkeleyowskie pojęcie analogii
